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The Brussels Conference of 1874 was convened after the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71).
At stake was not only the restoration of the fragile balance of power in Europe, but also the
articulation of a new ideal of warfare and its role in the European state system. This article
discusses the Conference in relation to the “new war” thesis put forth by Mary Kaldor in New
and Old Wars (1999). It was at Brussels that the “old war” crystalized as a political ideal: war
would be a tournament, fought by professional armies, organized by nation states; civilians
who refrained from participation would be protected from being attacked. At Brussels, this
view prevailed over the “total war” view, which would permit both deliberate targeting of
civilians and violent reprisal against them. Brussels laid the foundations for the further
development of international humanitarian law at The Hague Peace Conference of 1899.
La Conférence de Bruxelles de 1874, organisée après la guerre franco-prussienne
(1870-1871), visait non seulement à restaurer le fragile équilibre des pouvoirs en Europe, mais
aussi à formuler un nouvel idéal de guerre et à en définir le rôle au sein des États européens.
Cet article aborde la Conférence dans le contexte de la théorie de la « nouvelle guerre »
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avancée par Mary Kaldor dans son ouvrage New and Old Wars (1999). C’est à Bruxelles que
l’« ancienne guerre » s’est cristallisée en un idéal politique où la guerre serait un tournoi
mené par des armées professionnelles et organisé par des États-nations, et où les civils qui
s’abstiennent d’y participer seraient protégés contre les attaques. À Bruxelles, ce modèle
l’a emporté sur une autre vision, celle de la « guerre totale », qui implique au contraire
de cibler délibérément des civils et d’exercer des représailles violentes à leur encontre. La
Conférence de Bruxelles a jeté les bases nécessaires au développement ultérieur du droit
international humanitaire lors de la Conférence de la paix organisée à La Haye en 1899.
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I. NEW AND OLD WARS
THE BRUSSELS CONFERENCE OF 1874 produced the first international code of

land warfare, the draft Brussels Project of an International Declaration Concerning
the Laws and Customs of War (Brussels Declaration).1 The Brussels Declaration set
down the basic rules governing the treatment of prisoners of war, the laws of
belligerent occupation, and the treatment of civilians. It also set out the first
international rules governing the circumstances under which guerrilla fighters
may be authorized to wage war as lawful combatants.2 These rules were adopted
at the Hague Peace Conferences in 1899 and 1907 and codified in the Hague
Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land,3 but they were
formulated a quarter of a century earlier at the Brussels Conference of 1874.

1.
2.
3.

“Projet d’une Declaration Internationale concernant les Lois et Coutumes de la Guerre
(Texte Modifié par la Conférence),” Supplement to the London Gazette (24 October 1874)
24144 (5077, 3.42) [“Brussels Declaration”].
Ibid art 9.
Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex:
Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 29 July 1899, Annex to
the Convention: Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art 1;
Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex:
Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907, Annex
to the Convention: Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art 1
[Hague Regulations].
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Many of the debates that shaped these early laws of belligerent qualification
dealt with issues that remain contentious today: Under what conditions may
non-state actors lawfully wage war? May a state authorize ununiformed,
self-funded, and self-armed fighters to wage war on its behalf? When guerrilla
fighters are mixed in with a sympathetic civilian population, what steps need
to be taken by a hostile power to protect those civilians? Are reprisals against
civilians ever justified to end a violent insurgency and restore order?4
At Brussels in 1874, these debates arose directly out of the events of the recent
Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. The issues discussed at Brussels were similar to
those raised by Mary Kaldor in her 1999 work, New and Old Wars: Organized
Violence in a Global Era.5 Kaldor defines “new wars” as being characterized by the
breaking down of traditional categories of state power and violence in war: state
versus non-state, public versus private, internal versus external.6 Unlike old wars,
new wars have a fluid violence and make significant use of non-state guerrilla
fighters.7 Much of the violence takes place outside the conventional battlefield,
in urban areas and against the civilian population; identity politics leads to the
use of ethnic cleansing and population displacement.8
The Franco-Prussian War, like many conflicts, exhibited characteristics
of both “old” and “new” wars. This fact creates difficulties in using historical
evidence, particularly evidence of battle strategies, to support or disprove the
“new wars” thesis. In many ways, the Franco-Prussian War was a paradigmatic
example of an old war. It broke out as a clash between empires, namely the
Second French Empire of Napoleon III and the emerging German Empire led
by the Kingdom of Prussia. The war was largely a product of raison d’état: It was
fought to alter the European balance of power abroad and to foster nationalist
sentiments at home. Each side mobilized standing armies of unprecedented
size, the products of massive efforts at conscription, training, and preparation

4.

5.
6.
7.
8.

See e.g. Emily Crawford, “Regulating the Irregular: International Humanitarian Law and
the Question of Civilian Participation in Armed Conflict” (2011) 18:1 UC Davis J Intl L
& Pol’y 163 at 167-70; Sibylle Scheipers, Unlawful Combatants: A Genealogy of the Irregular
Fighter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) at 99-101; Geoffrey S Corn & Eric Talbot
Jensen, “Untying the Gordian Knot: A for Determining Applicability of the Laws of War on
Terror” (2008) 81:3 Temp L Rev 787.
Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, 3rd ed (Cambridge,
UK: Polity Press, 2012) [Kaldor, New and Old Wars].
Mary Kaldor, “In Defence of ‘New Wars’” (2013) 2:1 Stability: Int’l J Sec Dev 1 at 2 [Kaldor,
“In Defence of ‘New Wars’”].
Ibid at 2.
Ibid at 9.
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in peace-time.9 The belligerents made use of technological advances, including
railroads to mobilize troops quickly across great distances, as well as innovations
in weaponry that greatly increased the destructive power of artillery.10 As Michael
Howard states, “[i]n 1870 there dawned in Europe an age of ‘absolute war’ in a
sense which even Clausewitz had never conceived.”11
At the same time, the Franco-Prussian War exemplified many characteristics
of new wars, including weak and failed governance, official corruption,
the prevalence of non-state belligerents, the spilling of the battles and their
combatants into the cities and over the countryside, and the deliberate targeting
of civilians as a strategy of warfare. The French government all but collapsed
after Napoleon III capitulated to the German forces at Sedan.12 The French
army was easily defeated, due largely to the corruption of the Emperor, who
had converted much of the army stores for his own use.13 As L.P. Brockett and
John Abbott state, “almost every officer, from the highest to the lowest, had
followed [Napoleon III’s] example. Where he supposed he had a hundred soldiers
fully armed and equipped, there were found about fifty, and these imperfectly
supplied with arms and ammunition.”14 The provisional government had great
difficulties raising troops; these troops were poorly trained and equipped, and
often had no uniforms.15
After the conventional French forces were routed by Germany, the
provisional French government called up groups of irregular militia, including
the uniformed Garde Mobile, as well as individuals belonging to shooting clubs,
known as the francs-tireurs.16 Unlike regular troops, the francs-tireurs came out in
large numbers to fight.17 Some francs-tireurs wore uniforms, while others wore
only blue blouses with a red armband or shoulder strap.18 The francs-tireurs were
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Michael Howard, The Franco-Prussian War: The German Invasion of France, 1870-1871
(London: Routledge, 2001) at 3.
Ibid.
Ibid.
LP Brockett & John SC Abbott, The History of the Franco-German War of 1870-71 (Toronto:
AH Hovey, 1871) at 239.
Ibid at 116.
Ibid.
Ibid at 284-85.
US Army, A Treatise on the Juridical Basis of the Distinction between Lawful Combatant and
Unprivileged Belligerent (Charlottesville, Va: Judge Advocate General’s School, 1959) at 32
[JAG Treatise].
Brockett and Abbott, supra note 12 at 284—85.
Ibid. See also James M Spaight, War Rights on Land (London: MacMillan and Co,
1911) at 41-42.

Dowdeswell, The

Brussels Peace Conference of 1874 809

authorized, but not uniformed, trained, or equipped by the French government.
The occupying German forces refused to recognize the francs-tireurs as lawful
combatants, denying them prisoner of war status and executing them upon
capture.19 Germany denied not only the legitimacy of such fighters, but claimed
the right to engage in severe reprisals against the occupied population as a whole
in order to suppress what was essentially a guerrilla insurgency.20
After this time, the conflict became largely a guerrilla war. The francs-tireurs
harassed the Germans through such guerrilla tactics as hiding in ambush,
capturing convoys, destroying railways and bridges, and cutting supply lines.21
The citizenry of the contested territory of Alsace-Lorraine resisted the occupying
German forces. As a result, Germany directed reprisals against civilians in an
extremely brutal—and deliberate—strategy of using violence in terrorem against
the civilian population. German forces “hanged the culprits—or the suspected
culprits—whenever they caught them.”22 At other times, they burned entire
villages to the ground.23 As Howard states, “[b]y the end of October [1870] it
was clear to the Germans that the war had entered a stage in which terror and
counterterror were to play a formidable part.”24 By this time, there were few
discernable distinctions between public and private fighters, or between violence
involving civilians and violence involving military personnel.
Several variables are used to define and categorize new and old wars. In new
wars, the protagonists are more often non-state and private actors, frequently
warlords, terrorists, and organized criminal groups as opposed to public, state-led
institutions.25 The motivations of warring parties in new wars tend to involve issues
19. Alex J Bellamy, Massacres and Morality: Mass Atrocities in an Age of Civilian Immunity
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at 74. Particularly controversial was the Prussian
practice of reprisal killings against civilians in order to deter insurgent activity, or to punish
the killings of Prussian soldiers. Compare this with similar German practices in use during
World War II. See Trial of Wilhelm List and Others (Hostages Trial) No 47 (1947-48) Law
Reports of Trials of War Criminals, vol 8 (London: UN War Crimes Commission, 1949)
[Hostages Trial].
20. Letter No 34 from Sir A Horsford to the Earl of Derby (17 August 1874) in Foreign
Office (UK), Confidential Correspondence with Major-General Sir A. Horsford Respecting the
Conference at Brussels on the Rules of Military Warfare: July 25 to September 28, 1874 (London:
Foreign Office, 1874) 61 at 62 [Horsford Correspondence].
21. Howard, supra note 9 at 198. The hallmark of such guerrilla tactics is that arms are not
carried openly.
22. Ibid at 199.
23. Ibid at 200.
24. Ibid.
25. Edward Newman, “The ‘New Wars’ Debate: A Historical Perspective is Needed” (2004) 35:2
Security Dialogue 173 at 174.
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of identity, rather than ideology or territory as in old wars.26 The geography of
old wars revolves around state territory and its boundaries. Old wars are typically
inter-state conflicts whereas new wars are spatially fluid, intra-state, regional, and
transnational.27 New wars make use of military tactics such as ethnic cleansing
and forced displacement as opposed to the more traditional top-down techniques
of belligerent occupation and martial law.28 The technology of new wars is
typical of the post-modern era, using communications systems and surveillance
technologies, drones, as well as cheaper and more powerful small arms. The
political economy of new wars is determined by the means by which militant
and terrorist groups are funded and sustained economically. In new wars, money
and weapons are often filtered through terrorist or organized criminal groups and
sustained through government corruption; these activities are destabilizing, and
weaken state authority. Old wars are led and funded by states, and are meant to
centralize and consolidate the power of the state and its bureaucracies.29 Finally,
the humanitarian impact of new wars is often greater than that of old wars, as the
violence is waged in and amongst the civilian population and the guerrilla fighters
who shield themselves amongst them.30
Does the history of war bear out the “new war” thesis? Kaldor asserts that
it does, and that while many features of new wars can be found in earlier wars
in the modern era, it is not the individual characteristics that matter so much as
the patterns they form, and what this tells us about the changing nature of state
violence and power.31 Old wars were nation-building; they were about gaining
territory, certainly, but in waging war the state was centralizing its authority
and consolidating its power over the armed forces.32 Victory in war was a clear
goal.33 This was certainly true of the Franco-Prussian War. On the other hand,
“new wars tend to spread and to persist or recur as each side gains in political
or economic ways from violence itself rather than ‘winning’”; the goal is not

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Ibid at 174-75.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Kaldor, “In Defence of ‘New Wars,’” supra note 6 at 3-4.
Ibid at 3; see also Randall Lesaffer, “Siege Warfare in the Early Modern Age: A Study on
the Customary Laws of War,” in Amanda Perreau-Saussine & James B Murphy, eds, The
Nature of Customary Law: Legal, Historical and Philosophical Perspectives (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2009) 176 (discussing how the state consolidated its power over
the, largely private, armed forces in the early modern era).
33. Kaldor, “In Defence of ‘New Wars,’” supra note 6 at 3.
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necessarily victory, but sowing social and political breakdown.34 We can see these
forces at work in the conflicts of the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia, the South
Caucasus, Rwanda, and sub-Saharan Africa, as well as the more recent wars in
Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq.35
Edward Newman disagrees. While the “literature of the ‘new wars’ provides
a great service in explaining patterns of contemporary conflict…,” he claims that
“much of this is not new: all of the factors that characterize new wars have been
present, to varying degrees, throughout the last 100 years.”36 Newman argues
that a historical perspective is warranted, and that it may often challenge the
assumptions of the new wars thesis.37
At the same time, the historical research on the changing nature of war has
yielded mixed results. Given Kaldor’s claim that new wars have resulted from
economic and political changes arising out of the end of the Cold War and the
advance of neo-liberal globalization, most studies have focused on the end of the
Cold War as the fulcrum on which the strategies of the new wars were raised.
One such study performed at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research
at Uppsala University found no support for three key assertions of the new wars
thesis. It found that the intensity of wars was decreasing, not increasing; the
number of civilians displaced in wars was not noticeably rising; and the absolute
number of civilians killed in war was not increasing.38 In contrast, an empirical
study by Anouk Rigterink examined relative rather than absolute numbers and
found a number of trends in favour of the new wars thesis: A higher proportion
of civilians relative to military personnel was killed in battle from 1946-2010 and
that there was a relative increase in violence directed against civilians since the
end of the Cold War.39 On the question of whether there were more non-state
combatants in war, the evidence appears mixed.40 Rigterink concluded that there
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Ibid.
Ibid at 7.
Newman, supra note 25 at 179.
Ibid at 186.
Erik Melander, Magnus Öberg & Jonathan Hall, “The ‘New Wars’ Debate Revisited:
An Empirical Evaluation of the Atrociousness of ‘New Wars’” (2006) Department of Peace
and Conflict Research, Uppsala Peace Research Papers No 9 at 4-5.
39. Anouk Rigterink, “New Wars in Numbers: An Empirical Test of the ‘New Wars’ Thesis”
(2013) Security in Transition Discussion Paper at 4-5. See also Sven Chojnacki, “Anything
New or More of the Same? Wars and Military Interventions in the International System,
1946-2003” (2006) 20:1 Global Society 25 (looking at armed conflict since World War II
and concludes that while inter-state conflict is increasing, inter-state warfare still forms a key
part of the international system).
40. Rigterink, supra note 39 at 5.
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is more support for the new wars thesis when we look at relative trends rather
than absolute numbers.41 Monika Heupel and Bernhard Zangl compared three
wars that began during the Cold War and continued after 1990 (Cambodia,
Angola, and Afghanistan) with the post-1990 wars in Somalia and Sierra
Leone.42 They found not only that the new wars thesis was plausible based on the
evidence, but also that “the end of the Cold War was the triggering factor in the
transformation of warfare.”43
The above studies may have produced ambiguous results because they
focused on war-fighting strategies and tactics rather than the politics of state
power. Like the Franco-Prussian War, many conflicts have made use of state and
non-state actors, as well as conventional and guerrilla tactics of warfare. Practices
and strategies can shift dramatically, even within a single conflict, and over the
course of a few months. On the other hand, if we accept Kaldor’s thesis that new
wars are largely about the organizing logic of state power and how organized
violence is marshalled in its service, then a shift in these ideas can be seen clearly
at the Brussels Peace Conference in 1874. This is evidenced not by how the
Franco-Prussian War was waged in France, but by how the leading statesmen of
Europe came together at Brussels to articulate a new ideal of warfare and its role
in the late nineteenth century European state system. The key debates at Brussels
revolved around the questions of whether a state could authorize guerrilla fighters
to wage war on its behalf, and whether it could be lawful to wage an insurgency
against a foreign or occupying power. The answers to these questions had long
been affirmative—there were few restrictions on what kind of fighters a sovereign
power could authorize to wage war, or on the participation of the general civilian
population.44 By the late nineteenth century, however, these customs were
being destabilized by changes in the nature of state power, and the increasing
consolidation of state power over the armed forces. As a result, states adopted
discordant and contradictory views on the old customs, and these disagreements
came to a head over the way they had been applied in the Franco-Prussian War.
41. Ibid at 29.
42. Monika Heupel & Bernhard Zangl, “On the Transformation of Warfare: A Plausibility Probe
of the New War Thesis” (2010) 13:1 J Int’l Relat & Dev 26 at 29-30.
43. Ibid at 30.
44. Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli Ac Pacis, translated by J Barbeyrac (Clark, NJ: The Lawbook
Exchange, Ltd, 2004) at para III.V.i; Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Or, Principles of the
Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns, with Three Early
Essays on the Origin and Nature of Natural Law and on Luxury, ed by Béla Kapossy & Richard
Whatmore (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2008) at para III.II.9. For further discussion, see
Part II, below.
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Some states wished to ban the use of guerrilla fighters and restrict warfighting to
state-authorized, organized armed forces; other states asserted that they needed
these guerrilla fighters to defend themselves against aggression by the great
military powers.
The new draft rules adopted at Brussels might seem at first to limit sovereign
power, in that they restricted a state’s ability to authorize certain kinds of fighters
and permitted civilians to engage in insurgent activities against a foreign invader.
However, the debates at Brussels show that these rules were introduced to
strengthen state power over the military, not to limit it. Restricting the kinds
of fighters a state could authorize had the effect of privileging the standing
armies of the great military powers and consolidating the state’s power over the
use of military force. Permitting civilians to engage in an insurgency against an
invading power assisted a weak nation to defend itself against a stronger. Both
rules were the result of compromise and were intended to work together to
support the European balance of power. This observation supports the central
point of Kaldor’s thesis about old wars—that they were about nation-building
and consolidating state power.45
The political ideal of the “old war” crystalized at Brussels in 1874 as an ideal
of this restored balance of power. Baron Jhomini of Russia opened the conference
by stating the debate in the following terms:
[V]ery contradictory ideas prevail concerning war. There are those that would like it
made more terrible so as to make it less frequent, while others would turn it into a
tournament between regular armies with civilians simply as onlookers. People must
know where they stand… It is easier to do one’s duty than to define it. We must,
therefore, tell everyone what his duty is.46

The view of war as a tournament meant that it would be fought by professional
armies organized by nation states; civilians would not be permitted to participate
in the conflict, but they would be protected from attack. In the alternative view
of war, civilian participation would continue to be permitted, but just as they
could fight, they could be targeted. Reprisal violence against civilians would be
permitted, both to discourage civilians’ disloyalty to occupying powers and to
put down insurrection. This “more terrible” view of war—the “total war”—was

45. Kaldor, New and Old Wars, supra note 5 at 6.
46. Letter No 5 from Sir A Horsford to the Earl of Derby (31 July 1874), in Horsford
Correspondence, surpa note 20 at 5; translated & reprinted in Pierre Boissier, From Solferino
to Tsushima: History of the International Committee of the Red Cross (Geneva: Henry Dunant
Institute, 1985) at 292.

814

(2017) 54 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

recognized in the American Lieber Code of 1863,47 and was most forcefully
advocated at the time by American and German jurists. Yet the Germans failed
to make their case at Brussels in 1874, and The Hague Peace Conference of
1899 would adopt the Brussels Declaration as its template. Although the Brussels
Declaration was not ratified at the time, what clearly emerged from the conference
was the affirmation of the second vision of war over the first: war was to be
a tournament, civilians were to be excluded but protected, and there was an
affirmation of humanitarian goals and a clear rejection of the thesis that a sharp
war was a short war.
This article begins, in Part II, with a discussion of the laws and customs of
belligerent qualification in force before the Brussels Conference, focusing on the
significant changes brought about by the Lieber Code of 1863.48 Although Francis
Lieber recognized the need for new rules concerning guerrilla fighters and civilian
insurgents, he and the American jurists who followed him advocated the second,
rejected, view of war. According to them, an overwhelming show of force—even
including reprisals against civilians—was necessary to limit the violence of war
and restore order. At the same time, adopting the “tournament” view of war was
impractical, as a belligerent power could not change the rules according to which
its enemies fought, except through force.
Part III then examines the Brussels Conference itself through original source
material obtained from the archives of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of
the United Kingdom. This material includes the original notes and minutes of the
Conference proceedings as published at the time in the London Gazette,49 as well as
correspondence relating to the Conference published by the British Parliament.50
It also includes several volumes of previously unpublished confidential documents
of the Foreign Office of the United Kingdom, containing much diplomatic

47. US, General Order No 100, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in
the Field, Lincoln Administration, prepared by Francis Lieber (24 April 1863) [Lieber Code].
48. Ibid.
49. “Correspondence respecting the Conference at Brussels on the Rules of Military Warfare,”
Supplement to the London Gazette (23 October 1874) 24144 (4927-5111) [London Gazette].
50. Parliament of the United Kingdom and Great Britain, Correspondence Respecting the Proposed
Conference at Brussels on the Rules of Military Warfare, Miscellaneous No 1 (London: Harrison
& Sons, 1874) [Published Correspondence No I]; Correspondence Respecting the Proposed
Conference at Brussels on the Rules of Military Warfare, Miscellaneous No 2 (London: Harrison
& Sons, 1874) [Published Correspondence No II].
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correspondence with delegates from other nations in attendance.51 Finally, other
sources include the confidential correspondence between Major-General Sir
Alfred Horsford, the British delegate to the Conference, and Edward Stanley,
the Earl of Derby, who was then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.52 Part
IV will discuss the legacy that the Brussels Conference had on international
humanitarian law. Although its code of land warfare was not formally adopted,
it had a significant impact upon state practice almost immediately. It also gave
rise to the modern laws concerning belligerent qualification, many of which
remain in force today.

II. THE LIEBER CODE OF 1863: SHIFTING NORMS
CONCERNING GUERRILLA FIGHTERS
At the dawn of the modern era, the laws and customs of war did not demarcate
who was a lawful combatant, or a civilian. Laws and customs governing belligerent
qualification and civilian participation in warfare were the product of the long
consolidation of state power as it developed in the centuries following the Treaty
of Westphalia.53 As Leslie Green states, “[i]n ancient times, as evidenced by the
Laws of Manu, the Old Testament, or the writings of Kautilya or San Szu, there
was no attempt to identify those who were entitled to be treated as combatants.
... During feudal times, when the law of arms was developing there was equally
no attempt at definition.”54 The distinction between civilians and combatants was

51. UK Foreign Office, Confidential Correspondence Respecting the Proposed Conference at Brussels
on the Rules of Military Warfare, Part I, April 11 to July 4, 1874 (London: Foreign Office,
1874) [Confidential Correspondence Part I]; UK Foreign Office, Confidential Correspondence
Respecting the Proposed Conference at Brussels on the Rules of Military Warfare, Part II, June
30 to July 28, 1874 (London: Foreign Office, 1874) [Confidential Correspondence Part II];
UK Foreign Office, Confidential Correspondence Respecting the Proposed Conference at Brussels
on the Rules of Military Warfare, Part III, July 24 to August 5, 1874 (London: Foreign Office,
1874) [Confidential Correspondence Part III]; UK Foreign Office, Confidential Correspondence
Respecting the Proposed Conference at Brussels on the Rules of Military Warfare, Part IV,
November 28, 1874 to February 15, 1875 (London: Foreign Office, 1875) [Confidential
Correspondence Part IV]. Many of these materials are in French, the language of diplomacy in
nineteenth-century Europe, and the translations from French to English are the author’s own.
52. Horsford Correspondence, supra note 20.
53. Peace Treaty Between the Holy Roman Emperor and the King of France and their respective Allies
(Treaty of Westphalia), 24 October 1648 [Treaty of Westphalia].
54. Leslie C Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict, 3rd ed (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 2008) at 125.
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not yet recognized in the Middle Ages; violence was fluid, and non-combatants
often played a significant role in the war effort.
Hugo Grotius, in his 1625 De Jure Belli Ac Pacis, placed few limitations on
who may wage war or who may be attacked in war. Grotius recognized an almost
unrestricted right for a just party to use force against an enemy population.
He stated that the “rights of war” flowed solely from the sovereign authority by
which such crimes were authorized.55 Grotius stated that the “Slaughter of Infants
and Women is allowed, and included by the Right of War,” as was the wasting of
villages with fire and sword56—much as the Germans did to the French village of
Ablis in the fall of 1870.57
The first attempt to abolish private wars and institute national armies was
made by European states when they concluded the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 at
the close of the Thirty Year’s War (1618-1648). Article 118 states: “[T]he Troops
and Armys of all those who are making War in the Empire, shall be disbanded
and discharg’d; only each Party shall send to and keep up as many Men in his
own Dominion, as he shall judge necessary for his Security.”58 The Peace of
Westphalia was only the beginning of states’ consolidation of the use of military
force, however. In the century that followed,
the customs of war were still determined by the same professional elite that had
dominated them for ages and whose incorporation into the state was as yet far
from complete. ...While today’s international lawyers take it for granted that state
authorities dictate the behaviour of their military agents and lay down the law,
during the century after 1648 it was often the other way around.”59

Throughout the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the great
military and industrial powers of Europe began to professionalize their armies
and to demarcate the lawful scope of conflict by excluding those fighters who
were not organized into professional armed forces. Emerich de Vattel was one of
the earliest treatise writers to describe the situation of a soldier60 who was now a
professional,61 an agent of a public authority,62 subsumed under the command of
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Grotius, supra note 44.
Ibid at para III.IV.ix.
Howard, supra note 9 at 200.
Treaty of Westphalia, supra note 53 at para CXVIII.
Lesaffer, supra note 32 at 196.
Kaldor, “In Defence of ‘New Wars,’” supra note 6 at 126.
Vattel, supra note 44.
Ibid at para III.II.7. de Vattel describes the public authority requirement, stating that
the “power of levying troops, or raising an army, is of too great a consequence in a state,
to be entrusted to any other than the sovereign.”
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a higher officer.63 Vattel made no distinction, however, between those who could
and could not be authorized by the sovereign to wage war. To determine whether
a belligerent was qualified, it was only necessary to demonstrate that he had
been authorized by the sovereign to wage war; there were, in turn, no restrictions
on the kinds of fighters a sovereign might have authorized. A state, then, could
legally have authorized guerrilla fighters to wage war.
Vattel justified the introduction of standing armies primarily on humanitarian
grounds, arguing that it limited the violence of war. He stated:
If we confine our view to the law of nations, considered in itself,—when once two
nations are engaged in war, all the subjects of the one may commit hostilities against
those of the other, and do them all the mischief authorised by the state of war. But
should two nations thus encounter each other with the collective weight of their
whole force, the war would become much more bloody and destructive, and could
hardly be terminated otherwise than by the utter extinction of one of the parties.64

“It is therefore with good reason,” Vattel concluded, “that the contrary
practice has grown into a custom with the nations of Europe,—at least those that
keep up regular standing armies or bodies of militia. The troops carry on the war,
while the rest of the nation remain in peace.”65 Since Vattel, debates surrounding
the professionalization of armies have always considered the question of whether
consolidating force in a standing army will limit the violence of total war.
At the time of Vattel, the custom of standing armies was not universal
among European nations—it prevailed only among those who could maintain
standing armies or militia—and Vattel enumerated several exceptions to the
general custom. He stated that, “although the operations of war are by custom
generally confined to the troops” the inhabitants of a place taken by storm may
take up arms to recover the liberty of the territory on behalf of the sovereign,
“[a]nd where is the man that shall dare to censure it?”66 Here, Vattel articulated
the concept known today as a levée en masse, which remains protected by the

63. Ibid at para III.II.19-21 (on subordinate powers in war); ibid at para III.II.19 (the
commander-in-chief should have a nearly unlimited discretion to conduct war); ibid at para
III.II.18 (military discipline is of the utmost importance).
64. Ibid at para III.XV.226.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid at para III.XV.228.
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Third Geneva Convention.67 The levée en masse refers to civilian insurgents who
are not authorized, uniformed, or equipped by a national government, but
who spontaneously take up arms to repel a foreign invader. As will be discussed
below, whether this ancient practice should be abolished was one of the most
contentious issues at Brussels in 1874 and at The Hague Peace Conference in
1899.68 The smaller powers argued strenuously against its abolition, as it was
considered essential for their national defence.
The sovereign authorization rule articulated by Vattel was still the main
custom in use at the outbreak of the American Civil War (1861-65), but it was
coming under severe pressure as nation states continued to build their standing
armies and consolidate their monopoly over the use of military force. To clarify
the laws and customs of war applicable to US forces fighting in the Civil War, the
Lincoln administration commissioned Francis Lieber, a German American who
had been trained in the Prussian Army, to draft the Lieber Code.69 Lieber affirmed
the prevailing customary rule concerning guerrilla fighters, which stated that a
sovereign may authorize irregular fighters to wage war on its behalf. Article 57
of the Lieber Code states, “So soon as a man is armed by a sovereign government
and takes the soldier’s oath of fidelity, he is a belligerent; his killing, wounding,
or other warlike acts are not individual crimes or offences.” It was precisely this
rule that would buckle under the pressure of changing international consensus
in 1874 at Brussels.
Volunteer or militia corps—often referred to as partisans in the US Civil
War—were used by both sides of the conflict to supplement their regular armies.
Article 81 of the Lieber Code defined partisan soldiers by stating,
Partisans are soldiers armed and wearing the uniform of their army, but belonging to
a corps which acts detached from the main body for the purpose of making inroads
into the territory occupied by the enemy. If captured, they are entitled to all of the
privileges of the prisoner of war.70

67. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third Geneva Convention),
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135 art 4(6)
[Third Geneva Convention]. In Vattel’s formulation of the rule, levées en masse could retake
territory that had been lost; art 4(6) of the Third Geneva Convention restricts this only to the
time of invasion. This rule was derived from the discussions at the Brussels Conference. See
the text accompanying note 160 and following.
68. Rupert Ticehurst, “The Martens Clause and the Laws of Armed Conflict” (1997) 317 Int’l
Rev Red Cross 125 at 125. For further discussion, see the text accompanying note 242.
69. Lieber Code, supra note 47.
70. Ibid.
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Article 82 distinguished partisans from unqualified belligerents—often
referred to as brigands or guerrillas—as follows:
Men, or squads of men, who commit hostilities, whether by fighting, or inroads for
destruction or plunder, or by raids of any kind, without commission, without being
part and portion of the organized hostile army [and who occasionally return to their
civilian avocations] are public enemies, and, therefore, if captured, are not entitled
to the privileges of prisoners of war, but shall be treated summarily as highway
robbers or pirates.71

Often, individual irregulars would be arrested and court-martialed solely
on charges of being a brigand. Charges would be laid for such crimes as Free
Booting, Jayhawking, and Bushwacking—“all terms which were said to be so well
understood as to of themselves state a punishable offence without elaboration.”72
A distinction was drawn between more and less irregular troops. Sovereign
authorization remained a necessary condition of belligerent qualification, but the
Lieber Code further required that troops wear uniforms, be paid by and be “part
and portion of the organized army.”73 Thus, the Lieber Code reflects a transition
between the earlier period in which sovereign authorization was sufficient for
belligerent qualification, and the international agreements of the late nineteenth
century that imposed numerous organizational criteria that troops would have to
follow if they were to be considered lawful combatants.74
While drafting his code, Lieber was asked to address the issue of partisans in
greater depth. He produced a treatise entitled Guerrilla Parties Considered with
Reference to the Laws and Usages of War.75 Lieber called this a “new topic” in the
laws of war, and his purpose in writing the treatise was to sum up the applicable
practices and usages of states, rather than to propose new rules.76 Lieber summed
up the problem posed by guerrilla warfare during the Civil War by stating
that the “rebel authorities claim the right to send men, in the garb of peaceful
citizens, to waylay and attack our troops, to burn bridges and houses, and to
destroy property and persons within our lines.”77 Several Confederate leaders
openly claimed the right to use such non-uniformed partisan rangers to engage

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Ibid.
JAG Treatise, supra note 17 at 37.
Lieber Code, supra note 47 art 82.
JAG Treatise, supra note 17 at 45.
Francis Lieber, Guerrilla Parties Considered with Reference to the Laws and Usages of War (New
York: D van Nostrand, 1862) at 5.
76. Ibid at 1.
77. Ibid.
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in guerrilla attacks against Union soldiers.78 Governor John Letcher of Virginia,
claiming the right to authorize irregular guerrilla fighters, declared that all men
who had a commission from the state were entitled to the protections of soldiers
and prisoners of war.79 Confederate General Thomas Hindman asserted that
the Confederacy would be bound only by military necessity, not laws imposed
by foreign powers. Another Confederate commander declared, “We cannot be
expected to allow our enemies to decide for us…whether we shall fight them in
masses or individually, in uniform, without uniform, openly or from ambush.”80
In his treatise, Lieber defined guerrilla troops as being “self-constituted or
constituted by the call of a single individual, not according to the general law of
levy, conscription, or volunteering.”81 Lieber distinguished these fighters from
partisans, for whom he proposed the definition of partisan troops that he would
later adopt as Article 82 of the Lieber Code.82 In his treatise, Lieber attempted
to define the difference between guerrilla and partisan troops on the basis of
the sovereign authorization rule: partisan troops were called up according to
the general law of levy and were part and portion of the regular army, whereas
guerrilla troops were self-constituted or called up at the behest of an individual.83
However, Lieber also recognized that guerrilla fighters were in fact called up by
the Confederate authorities, who were indeed claiming the right to authorize and
to use such troops.84 The sovereign authorization rule would have permitted this;
if the use of such irregulars were to be prohibited, then some other rule would be
required. Lieber declined to propose a new rule, but in the interests of humanity
he did attempt to restrain the worst abuses against such troops, recognizing that
“it will be difficult for the captor of guerrilla-men to decide at once whether they
are regular partisans, distinctly authorized by their own government,” and so
there should be a presumption that they are to be treated as regular partisans, and
according to the law.85
Even as he urged leniency and humanity against irregular troops, Lieber
preferred to leave the actual formulation of policies concerning guerrilla fighters
up to the legislative and executive powers, without seeking to circumscribe their
78. John Fabian Witt, Lincoln’s Code: The Laws of War in American History (New York: Free
Press, 2012) at 192.
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid.
81. Supra note 75 at 8.
82. Ibid at 11.
83. Ibid at 8. Lieber may have had a corps such as Mosby’s Rangers in mind when he wrote this.
84. Ibid at 5.
85. Ibid at 20.
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discretion through general rules of law.86 John Fabian Witt argues that Lieber did
more than just declare the law, however. He states that Lieber’s chief innovation
was to focus on the characteristics that made men soldiers.87 These characteristics
included open and visible manifestations of the legitimacy and permanency of the
fighting group, such as uniforms, insignia, and the permanence of the regiment.88
This moved the law, for the first time, away from the sovereign authorization rule
and toward the view that something more was required for lawful belligerency,
although that something had not yet been articulated with precision.
The legal rules respecting belligerent qualification have always had at
their core issues concerning the right of insurrection, resistance to invasion,
and the treatment to be afforded to an occupied enemy population. The rules
for distinguishing belligerents from civilians and protecting the latter are in
many ways two sides of the same coin, and the customary rules for belligerent
qualification and civilian protection grew up together. Civilians have generally
been defined in the law as all those persons who are not qualified belligerents;
qualified belligerents are those who fight according to the criteria laid out in
Annex B of the Hague Regulations, so that they might be distinguished from
civilians, who are defined negatively as all those persons who possess no belligerent
privileges and who are immune from attack.89
The Lieber Code of 1863, while an important transitional document in the
modern laws of war, did not espouse what we now call the principle of civilian
immunity, currently expressed in Article 51(3) of the First Protocol Additional to
the Geneva Conventions.90 Lieber did recognize a growing usage of distinguishing
combatants from non-combatants, when stating in Article 22:
Nevertheless, as civilization has advanced during the last centuries, so has likewise
steadily advanced, especially in war on land, the distinction between the private
86.
87.
88.
89.

Ibid at 21-22.
Witt, supra note 78 at 193.
Ibid at 193-4; Lieber, Guerrilla Parties, supra note 75 at 18.
The present rules are set out in the Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1977. See
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 art 50(1) (defining “civilians” as “A civilian is
any person who does not belong to one of the categories of persons referred to in Article 4 A
1), 2), 3) and 6) of the Third Convention and in Article 43 of this Protocol. In case of doubt
whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian”) [Protocol
I]; See also Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609 art 4 [Protocol II].
90. Protocol I, supra note 89.
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individual belonging to a hostile country and the hostile country itself, with its men
in arms. The principle has been more and more acknowledged that the unarmed
citizen is to be spared in person, property, and honor as much as the exigencies of
war will admit.91

Lieber found this to be a growing custom among those peoples he described
as “civilized.”92 Yet he also posited a number of exceptions to this rule, permitting
sieges and bombardments of noncombatants,93 and the starvation of civilians
to promote their capitulation.94 Lieber demonstrated a flexible and pragmatic
approach that gave deference to the discretion of military commanders, allowing
that civilians should be protected only “as much as the exigencies of war will
admit.”95 Unarmed civilians he divided into those who were loyal and those
who were perceived as disloyal to the occupying army. Disloyal civilians were
to include those who “sympathize with the rebellion without positively aiding
it, and those who, without taking up arms, give positive aid and comfort to the
rebellious enemy.”96 The “commander will throw the burden of war, as much as
lies within his power, on the disloyal citizens.”97
The draft code of international law put forth by David Dudley Field largely
followed the Lieber Code on the issues of belligerent qualification and civilian
protection. Using political, rather than military, concepts Field defined “active
enemies” to include “disloyal civilians” who, although they had not actually
taken up arms, nevertheless “unlawfully give aid and comfort to the opposing
belligerent.”98 Field stated that such civilians could lawfully be killed by any
91. Lieber Code, supra note 47.
92. Ibid, art 25.
93. Ibid, art 18 (“When a commander of a besieged place expels the noncombatants, in order
to lessen the number of those who consume his stock of provisions, it is lawful, though an
extreme measure, to drive them back, to as to hasten on the surrender”). See also art 19
(“Commanders, whenever admissible, inform the enemy of their intention to bombard a
place, so that the noncombatants, and especially the women and children, may be removed
before the bombardment commences. But it is no infraction of the common law of war to
omit thus to inform the enemy. Surprise may be a necessity”). Compare Protocol I, supra note
89 art 57 (the stringent requirements that armies must now undertake).
94. Lieber code, supra note 47 art 17 (“War is not carried on by arms alone. It is lawful to
starve the hostile belligerent, armed or unarmed, so that it leads to the speedier subjection
of the enemy”).
95. Ibid, art 22.
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid, art 156.
98. David Dudley Field, Draft Outlines of an International Code (New York: Baker, Voorhis &
Company, 1872) at para 746.3 [Field’s Code]. Cf Lieber Code, supra note 47 art 155 (defining
disloyal civilians as those who, without taking up arms, sympathize with the rebellion, or give
positive aid and comfort to the rebels).
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army or occupying force.99 Concerning the treatment of civilians who were not
actively providing aid and comfort to the enemy, Field stated that “[f ]or the
purpose of self-preservation, a belligerent may ravage or lay waste the territory
of the hostile nation.”100 Again, this closely reproduced similar provisions from
the Lieber Code.101 Field’s code did not propose any great innovations in the laws
of war—particularly on the points that were most contentious at the Brussels
Conference: Field’s proposed norms concerning qualified belligerency and the
rights of occupied populations closely followed the Lieber Code, and did not
take into account the debates then taking place on the European continent.102
For Lieber and Field, these kinds of reprisals were justified if they brought
disloyal citizens and rebellious peasants to heel, and ended the war more quickly.
However, it was precisely this idea of the war of reprisals—that “sharp wars are
brief ”103—that would be rejected at Brussels in favour of the view of war as a
tournament between great armies.
Lieber’s approach to the problem would be influential in Europe in other
ways, however. In preparation for the Brussels Conference, a draft code of the
laws of land warfare, provisionally entitled the Draft Declaration Concerning the
Laws and Customs of War (Draft Declaration), was drawn up by the Russian jurist
Fyodor de Martens and circulated to the various states that were invited to the
Conference.104 Martens had been strongly influenced by Lieber’s example of
setting down the laws of war with precision and then issuing them as instructions
to armies in the field.105 Martens thought that this method of articulating and
enforcing the laws of war would be appropriate for the international community
as a whole: each nation would adopt and enforce an international code of
land warfare that had been formulated through the negotiation and consent
99. Field’s Code, supra note 98.
100. Ibid at para 839. Field cites Henry Wheaton & William Beach Lawrence, Wheaton’s Elements
of International Law, 2nd ed (Boston: Little Brown & Company, 1863) at para 6.
101. Lieber Code, supra note 47 arts 17-18.
102. F de Martens, La Paix et la Guerre: La Conférence de Bruxelles 1874, Droits et Devoirs des
Belligérants (Leur Application pendant la Guerre d’Orient 1874-1878), La Conférence de La
Haye 1899, translated by N De Sancé (Paris: Arthur Rousseau, 1901) at vi, 77-78.
103. Lieber Code, supra note 47 art 29.
104. Letter No 7 from Prince Gortchakow to Count Brunnow (Communicated by Count
Brunnow to the Earl of Derby) (11 May 1874) in Published Correspondence Part I, supra note
50 at 5-6. This draft code was referred to by the delegates at the Brussels Conference as the
“Original Project,” and the final declaration as the “Final Project” or “Final Protocol.” The
entire project of convening the conference and drafting an international code of land warfare
is often referred to as the “Russian Project.”
105. Ibid at 77-78.
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of individual nation states.106 This was the genesis of the idea of the draft
Brussels Declaration. At the same time, Johann Bluntschli, a noted scholar of
international law at the University of Heidelberg, would translate the Lieber Code
into German, and it would become the Prussian Code of Land Warfare that was
in use during the Franco-Prussian War.107 The failure of Lieber’s code to prohibit
the use of irregular troops, to prevent the slaughter of insurgents and suspected
insurgents, and to quell international disagreements concerning the behavior
of armies towards such actors is unsurprising. Disputes over these rules would
come to a head over the francs-tireurs called up by the French government during
the Franco-Prussian War. The Lieber Code could not prevent these atrocities
or resolve these disputes. For this, a new international code of land warfare
would be required.

III. THE BRUSSELS CONFERENCE, 27 JULY TO 27 AUGUST
1874
After the main body of France’s conventional forces was routed by the armies
of Prussia, the provisional government was forced to call up groups of irregular
fighters, including the francs-tireurs.108 Francs-tireurs were not recognized
by Germany, who “treated all these forces, without distinction, as unlawful
belligerents, although all were authorized by the French government.”109 The
Germans required not only uniforms but also clear evidence of sovereign
authorization, for which
each individual irregular combatant was required to have on his person a certificate
of his character as a soldier, issued by a legal authority, and addressed to him
personally, to the effect that he was called to colors, and was borne on the rolls of a
corps organized on a military footing by the French government.110

These requirements were impossible to meet111—the French government
was experiencing significant difficulties outfitting even its remaining regular

106. Ibid.
107. Witt, supra note 78 at 327-28, 343. See also George B Davis, “Doctor Francis Lieber’s
Instructions for the Government of Armies in the Field” (1907) 1:1 Am J Int’l L 13 at 22.
108. JAG Treatise, supra note 17 at 32.
109. Ibid.
110. Ibid at 33.
111. Spaight, supra note 18 at 45. Spaight reports that a German jurist had doubted whether
“such a demand can be insisted upon.”
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armies112—and large numbers of francs-tireurs were executed upon capture.113
At the Brussels Conference, France sought legal recognition for such irregular
combatants, and was supported by many smaller European nations that were also
unable to raise and equip professional standing armies of their own.114 The old
sovereign authorization rule was failing to perform the function of distinguishing
which combatants were authorized, or protecting captives, and this had resulted
in large numbers of casualties. Uncertainty over the applicable rules was a source
of contention between the European powers, who disagreed over the terms of
the emerging customary law regarding belligerent qualification. The dispute over
the francs-tireurs concerned “whether an insurgent population in an occupied
territory should be considered lawful combatants,” 115 entitled to all the privileges
and immunities of prisoners of war.
It was with the goal of clarifying the emerging customs of war that Tsar
Alexander II of Russia called the Brussels Conference in 1874. The resolution
of this dispute would give rise to the modern laws of belligerent qualification.116
The original Russian Circular of 17 April 1874 announcing the Conference
spoke of international solidarity and fostering consensus among nations; in this
way, states might establish with greater clarity the rules of war that would bind
all governments and would be issued as instructions to their armies in the
field.117 The Conference was convened in Brussels from 27 July to 27 August
1874. Represented at the Conference were the great powers of Germany, France,
Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, Russia, and Great Britain, as well as the
secondary powers of Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands,
Sweden and Norway, and Switzerland.118 Portugal joined the Conference on the
3rd of August.119 Several Delegates from the South American states were offered a
place on the eve of the Conference, but they declined as they had not been formally
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Boissier, supra note 46 at 243.
JAG Treatise, supra note 17 at 34.
Ibid at 41-42.
Peter Holquist, The Russian Empire as a Civilized State: International Law as Principle and
Practice in Imperial Russia, 1874-1878 (Washington, DC: National Council for Eurasian and
East European Research, 2004) at 13.
Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907, supra note 3.
Letter No 7 from Prince Gortchakow to Count Brunnow (Communicated by Count
Brunnow to the Earl of Derby) (11 May 1874)” in Published Correspondence Part I,
supra note 50 at 6.
Letter No 5 from Sir A Horsford to the Earl of Derby (31 July 1874) in Horsford
Correspondence, supra note 20 at 4.
Letter No 24 from Sir A Horsford to the Earl of Derby (7 August 1874), Horsford
Correspondence, supra note 20 at 29.
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invited.120 Persia was invited but did not attend for reasons that have not been
recorded.121 The United States was also invited to the Conference, but declined.122
Attendees brought diverse interests to the Conference. The secondary powers
Spain, Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland maintained the legitimacy of calling
up irregular forces to fight an occupying power.123 Great Britain considered
francs-tireurs as lawful combatants, their status similar to that of privateers. The
Earl of Denbigh stated as much in a House of Commons debate on the war
in 1871,124 and this view would be echoed by Cavendish Bentick, who stated
that “belligerent Powers had to the full as much right to employ privateers as
Francs-Tireurs, torpedoes, or Gardes Mobiles.”125 Germany, on the other hand,
strenuously argued against this practice, and instead demanded that irregular
forces be outlawed, as their use would only result in military escalation and cruel
reprisals.126 Martens “argued that the German claim that military necessity took
precedence over all else in fact amounted to a denial of international law as a
principle.”127 The German position was thus similar to that of earlier Confederate
leaders: They would be guided by military necessity rather than foreign laws
imposed by their enemies.128 An international code of land warfare would instead
be based upon principles of humanitarianism, and would “mitigate the horrors
of war, in accordance with the legal awareness and humanism that were growing
among the general public.”129
In fact, at this time several groups in Europe were advocating for a more
complete international code for the conduct of warfare. These included the
International League for Peace and Freedom and the Association for Reform and
Codification of the Law of Nations, which shared the goal of wanting to impose
120. Letter No 3 from Sir A Horsford to the Earl of Derby (28 July 1874) in Horsford
Correspondence, supra note 20 at 3.
121. Letter No 3 from Lord A Loftus to the Earl of Derby (13 July 1874) in Published
Correspondence Part II, supra note 50 at 2.
122. Letter No 1 from the Earl of Derby to Sir A. Horsford (Foreign Office, 25 July 1874)” in
Horsford Correspondence, supra note 20 at 1.
123. Spaight, supra note 18 at 50.
124. UK, HL, Parliamentary Debates, 3rd ser, vol 207, col 197 at 202 (19 June 1871)
(Earl of Denbigh).
125. UK, HC, Parliamentary Debates, 3rd ser, vol 205, col 1469 at 1478 (21 April 1871).
126. Letter No 34 from Sir A Horsford to the Earl of Derby (17 August 1874) in Horsford
Correspondence, supra note 20 at 62.
127. Holquist, supra note 115 at 5.
128. Witt, supra note 78 at 192-3.
129. Vladimir V Pustogarov, “Fyodor Fyodorovich Martens (1845-1909) – A Humanist
of Modern Times” (1996) 312 Int’l Rev Red Cross 300 [Pustogarov, “Humanist of
Modern Times”].
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the rule of law on states’ conduct of war.130 The Society for the Improvement of
the Condition of Prisoners of War, led by the Comte de Houdetot and Henri
Dunant, had originally proposed a conference in Paris to discuss the adoption
of an international convention relating to prisoners of war, but this plan was
preempted by the Russian project.131 The Society called off the Paris Conference in
deference to Russia, but when they arrived in Brussels with their delegation, they
were denied entry by the state delegates, who determined that only “European
Powers such as those invited, could be allowed to attend or take part in the in
the proceedings of the Conference.”132 None of these non-governmental groups
sought to adopt the Prussian Code of Land Warfare translated from Lieber.
Baron Jhomini, the principal Russian delegate and Chairman of the
Conference, made it clear in his opening statement that what was at stake was
the very idea of war itself in the modern age.133 Germany’s views were essentially
militaristic—echoing the “sharp wars are brief ” thesis earlier put forward by
Lieber and Field.134 Their argument assumed that military violence was an
effective—perhaps even the preeminent—tool for maintaining security and
social order and for carrying out political goals and administrative tasks. Baron
Jhomini, on the other hand, stated that wars should be made more and more
rare, and until this could take place their harms should be mitigated as much as
possible.135 He reiterated the words of the St. Petersburg Declaration—that the
only legitimate goal of war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy, and
to achieve as quickly as possible restoration of a durable and lasting peace.136
He stated that, at the present time:
[V]ery contradictory ideas prevail concerning war. There are those that would like it
made more terrible so as to make it less frequent, while others would turn it into a
tournament between regular armies with civilians simply as onlookers. People must
know where they stand… It is easier to do one’s duty than to define it. We must,
therefore, tell everyone what his duty is.137
130. Boissier, supra note 46 at 285.
131. Letter No 2 from The Universal Alliance, London Branch to the Earl of Derby (16 April
1874) in Published Correspondence Part I, supra note 50 at 2.
132. Letter No 19 from Sir A Horsford to the Earl of Derby (6 August 1874) in Horsford
Correspondence, supra note 20 at 23.
133. Boissier, supra note 46 at 292.
134. Field’s Code, supra note 98 and accompanying text.
135. Letter No 5 from Sir A Horsford to the Earl of Derby (31 July 1874) in Horsford
Correspondence, supra note 20 at 5.
136. Ibid at 6.
137. Letter No 5 from Sir A Horsford to the Earl of Derby (31 July 1874) in Horsford, supra note
20 at 5; translated & reprinted in Boissier, supra note 46 at 292.
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While the delegates at the Brussels Conference generally agreed with
the above view of war, the fault lines developed along pragmatic rather than
ideological lines. The secondary powers were simply unable to organize and equip
the kind of regular military that this tournament of war demanded, and that
Germany already possessed; instead, they maintained that they needed to rely on
the conscription of irregular forces to secure their defense against foreign invasion.
One of the great advances of the Brussels Conference was the formulation of
the four organizational criteria for belligerent qualification, later adopted into the
Hague Regulations138 and Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention, which forms
the basis for our present laws governing belligerent qualification.139 An early
formulation of these rules was delivered in a paper read by Henry Richmond
Droop, a barrister of Lincoln’s Inn Fields, to the Juridical Society of London
on 30 November 1870.140 Droop’s paper addressed the most pressing topic in
international law of the day—the status of the francs-tireurs—and he articulated
many of the key concepts of modern international humanitarian law. In particular,
Droop espoused the four organizational criteria and linked the law of belligerent
qualification with the emerging principle of civilian immunity. He stated that
troops must be required to distinguish themselves from civilians in order that
civilians might be protected from the ravages of war141—the idea that now forms
the basis of humanitarian law and the modern principles of distinction and
civilian immunity.
Droop recognized that sovereign authorization remained, at that time, the
generally accepted rule for belligerent qualification.142 However, he argued that
this rule was no longer desirable for regulating present-day conflicts, and he
proposed instead a rule for belligerent qualification based upon objective and
138. Hague Regulations, supra note 3.
139. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 67.
140. JAG Treatise, supra note 17 at 47. Henry Richmond Droop was a lawyer and mathematician.
He also studied proportional representation in elections, and was an early originator of
game theory, as well as the single transferable vote system. See HR Droop, “On Methods of
Electing Representatives” (1881) 44:2 J Statistical Soc’y London 141.
141. HR Droop, “The Relations Between an Invading Army and the Inhabitants, and the
Conditions Under Which Irregular Combatants are Entitled to the Same Treatment as
Regular Soldiers” (30 November 1870) in Papers Read Before the Juridical Society: 1863-1870,
vol III (London: Wildy & Sons Law Booksellers and Publishers, 1871) 705 at 716 [Droop,
“Irregular Combatants”]; see also HR Droop, “The Relations Between an Invading Army
and the Inhabitants, and the Conditions Under Which Irregular Combatants are Entitled
to the Same Treatment as Regular Troops” (17 December 1870) 15 Solicitors’ J & Rep 121
(reprinting an abridged version of the full paper).
142. Droop, “Irregular Combatants,” supra note 141 at 717.
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readily observable criteria.143 Droop rejected the sovereign authorization rule144
on the grounds that sovereign authorization alone would make it impossible to
distinguish between troops and civilians, or to enforce respect for the laws of
war on the part of belligerents.145 Civilians should not be attacked in war, and
protecting them is the responsibility of the armed forces who would wage that
war.146 At the same time, Droop argued that his rules for belligerent qualification
would benefit armies as well. Regular troops must have some security for
reciprocity from enemy troops, and
[t]his security they can hardly have unless the combatants they are fighting against
are so connected with the national army that any part of this army can be held
responsible for their conduct. … Therefore to entitle them to the privileges of
regular troops they ought to be under the actual control of officers who are in
communication with, and responsible to, the commanders of the national army…147

This result could only be accomplished by clear standards for belligerent
qualification, which Droop outlined as follows:
1.

They must have an authorization from an established Government or from
some de facto substitute for such a government.

2.

They must be under the actual control of officers who are recognized by, and
responsible to, the chief military authorities of the state.

3.

They must themselves observe the rules of war.

4.

All combatants intended to act singly or in small parties must have a permanent
distinctive uniform, but this is not indispensable for troops acting together in
large bodies.

5.

Levies en masse of the whole population are legitimate combatants provided
they comply with the above conditions, but not otherwise.148

Droop’s formulation of belligerent qualification set out the basic outlines
and rationale for the Brussels Declaration, including the importance of discipline
maintained through a clear chain of command, yet it differs from the final
Brussels Declaration in three key respects. First, Droop would have eliminated
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Ibid.
Ibid at 713; see also Vattel, supra note 44 at para III.XV.228.
Droop, “Irregular Combatants,” supra note 141 at 713.
Ibid.
Ibid at 715.
Ibid at 720. Droop notes that these conditions go far beyond what Lieber and Bluntschli,
“the most recent authorities who have treated that subject at any length,” would have
required (ibid), and he calls for an international convention to settle the rules in a more
definitive manner (ibid at 724).
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entirely the ancient concept of levée en masse. Instead, he required that insurgents
follow the same organizational criteria as regular troops to distinguish themselves
from civilians; otherwise, it would be too difficult to identify and protect the
non-combatant population. Second, Droop significantly relaxed the requirements
for uniforms. Providing uniforms to a large army takes considerable time and
expense, and therefore uniforms are not always available, provided troops have
other means of distinguishing themselves.149 Third, Droop recognized that a de
facto authority could authorize the use of force, provided that it is able to discipline
its troops. These last two ideas would be rejected at the Brussels Conference, but
similar ideas would appear a hundred years later in Protocol I.150
The modern definition of a “lawful combatant” first appeared in its essential
form in Article 9 of the Draft Declaration presented at Brussels, and was based
upon Droop’s organizational criteria, including wearing a distinctive insignia,
carrying arms openly, and being subsumed under a nation state’s military chain
of command so that the laws and customs of war can be enforced by a qualified
public authority. Article 9 of the Draft Declaration that was placed before the
Brussels Conference for discussion read as follows:
The rights of belligerents shall not only be enjoyed by the army, but also by the
militia and volunteers in the following cases:
1.

If, having at their head a person responsible for his subordinates, they are at the
same time subject to orders from headquarters;

2.

If they wear some distinctive badge, recognizable at a distance;

3.

If they carry arms openly; and

4.

If, in their operations they conform to the laws, customs, and procedure of war.

Armed bands not complying with the above-mentioned conditions shall not possess
the rights of belligerents; they shall not be considered as regular enemies, and in the
case of capture shall be proceeded against judicially.151

149. Ibid.
150. Protocol I, supra note 89 art 44(3) (allowing combatants to distinguish themselves solely by
carrying arms openly); and art 43(1) (requiring that a Party to a conflict, even if that Party is
not recognized by an adverse Party, may qualify its armed forces provided that it institutes a
disciplinary system which ensures compliance with the laws of war).
151. Inclosure in letter No 52 from Sir A Horsford to the Earl of Derby, “Report on the
Proceedings of the Brussels Conference on the proposed Rules for Military Warfare”
(7 September 1874) in Horsford Correspondence, supra note 20 at 164 [“Report of
the Conference”].
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This final sentence was intended to prevent the reprisal killings that were
undertaken against the francs-tireurs by the Germans. However, many of the
delegates thought that it remained too harsh, and proposed that it be struck
altogether.152 The final Brussels Declaration states in Article 9:
The laws, rights and duties of war, apply not only to armies, but also to militia and
volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions:
1.

That they be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;

2.

That they have a fixed distinctive emblem recognisable at a distance [so that
they may be distinguished from the civilian population];

3.

That they carry arms openly; and

4.

That they conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs
of war.153

The Brussels Declaration thus formalized the position that sovereign
authorization was insufficient; a government could authorize only those troops
that met the four core organizational criteria.
There is a similarity between Article 9 of the Draft Declaration and the
criteria outlined by Droop at Lincoln’s Inn.154 Martens had read Droop’s speech
to the Juridical Society of London when preparing for the Brussels Conference,155
as he also did the Lieber Code and Lieber’s treatise on Guerrilla Parties.156 Indeed,
Martens had studied the topic closely before drafting the Brussels Declaration.
He states, “During the war of 1870-1871, being close to the theatre of war,
I collected from the newspapers of all countries and through personal contacts
all the facts which established a violation of the laws and customs of war.
Already I had come to the conclusion that the establishment by the governments
themselves of these laws and customs was entirely necessary in order to prevent
endless occupations and merciless reprisals.”157 In this, Martens was in agreement
with Droop,158 particularly Droop’s proposal to convene an international
152. Ibid at 165.
153. “Brussels Declaration,” supra note 1 art 9.
154. JAG Treatise, supra note 17 at 47. The Treatise also notes that the Hague Regulations are
essentially the criteria outlined by Droop (“Irregular Combatants,” supra note 141), and
that “we are now using rules based upon the experience in the Franco-Prussian war”
(ibid at 47-48).
155. Martens, supra note 102 at 96.
156. Witt, supra note 78 at 343.
157. Vladimir V Pustogarov, Our Martens: F.F. Martens, International Lawyer and Architect of Peace
(London: Kluwer Law International, 2000) at 109 [Pustogarov, Our Martens].
158. Martens, supra note 102 at 96.
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convention, such as those held earlier at Paris and Geneva, for the purpose of
settling these matters.159
Even more contentious than the criteria for belligerent qualification was the
narrower question of whether inhabitants of an invaded or occupied territory
had the right to take up arms in the national defence. Article 10 of the Brussels
Declaration recognized levées en masse—members of the population who take up
arms spontaneously to repel an invading force—as qualified belligerents without
their having to adhere to all four organizational criteria:
The population of a territory which has not been occupied, who, on the approach of
the enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading troops without having
had time to organise themselves in accordance with Article 9, shall be regarded as
belligerents if they respect the laws and customs of war.160

The population of a territory that was already occupied thereby lost the
right to resist through force of arms, and lawful belligerents were not to include
“groups of the inhabitants of an occupied territory who take up arms subsequent
to the occupation to harass or engage the occupant.”161 Even the German delegate
at the Brussels Conference admitted that, “amongst those unfortunate peasants
who were shot in virtue of the laws of war, many were guilty of nothing more
than having obeyed an instinctive and almost irresistible sentiment of local
patriotism.”162 However, Germany also took the position that countries must
develop a strong military organization, so as to enforce the laws and usages of
war, and ensure that military force would be effective.163 Article 10 was therefore
a compromise solution: the Brussels Declaration declined to require that levées
en masse follow the organizational requirements for belligerent qualification laid
down in Article 9, but also declined to abolish the concept, instead restricting it
temporally to the time of invasion.
This contentious issue was debated during a tense meeting on 14 August
1874. Prior to the Conference, the Germans had declared their position on
irregular troops as follows:
With regard to the question of volunteer forces - “Francs-tireurs” and “levées en
masse” - Major-General Walker learns that, as the Germans have no such auxiliary
forces, and as the Landsturm is to be put under legal and Parliamentary control, the
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Ibid at 96-97.
Green, supra note 54 at 129-30.
Ibid at 130.
Spaight, supra note 18 at 49.
Letter No 34 from Sir A Horsford to the Earl of Derby (17 August 1874) in Horsford
Correspondence, supra note 20 at 62.
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policy will be to endeavour to force the French into a like course, by discouraging all
immunities to volunteers and free corps.164

The Germans reiterated this position at the Conference, stating that it was
expedient “in the interests of humanity that no encouragement be given to the
inhabitants of an occupied district to rise against the invader”—as the French had
done in the late conflict—“as such a course would lead to repressive measures,
which, instead of diminishing the horrors of war, would tend to increase them.”165
This is essentially the same view of war espoused by Lieber and Field.
None of the other delegates present at the Conference supported this view.
The Belgian delegate, Baron Lambermont, pointed out the practical difficulties
of organizing and funding a regular army of the kind deployed by Germany.
He pointed out that, despite the time and sacrifices they had put into the defense
of their countries, the armed forces of the secondary nations would always be
inferior to those of the great powers; he spoke, therefore, in glowing terms of the
necessity for such countries to preserve those “patriotic” and “heroic” sentiments
that led their subjects to rise and defend their nations.166 Concerning the proposed
punishment of irregular forces who resisted an occupying power, he stated that
if citizens were to be sacrificed for having attempted to defend their country at the
peril of their lives, they need not find inscribed on the post at the foot of which they
are about to be shot, the Article of a Treaty signed by their own Government, which
had in advance condemned them to death.167

Privately, the Belgian Under-Secretary communicated to Major-General
Horsford in plainer terms that:
[A]ny inhabitants who might rise in rear of the invaders, would be liable to be
treated by the enemy with the utmost rigour, whereas (to make use of the words
employed by the Under-Secretary himself ) the inhabitants would most probably
be shot by the Belgians themselves if they did not rise in defence of their own
standard; and, he continued, neither the Government nor even the King would dare
to propose to them any other course.168

164. Letter No 40 from Mr Adams to the Earl of Derby (22 June 1874) in Confidential
Correspondence Part I, supra note 51 at 23.
165. Letter No 34 from Sir A Horsford to the Earl of Derby (17 August 1874) in Horsford
Correspondence, supra note 20 at 62.
166. “Séance du 14 Août, 1874” in Horsford Correspondence, supra note 20 at 84 [“Séance du
14 Août, 1874”].
167. “Report of the Conference,” supra note 151 at 175.
168. Letter No 11 from Sir A Horsford to the Earl of Derby (3 August 1874) in Horsford
Correspondence, supra note 20 at 12-13.
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The delegates at Brussels thus recognized the impossible position in which
their current laws placed those inhabitants—peasant fighters who were expected
to sacrifice their lives in the interests of their sovereign—even as they were eager
to establish their powers and prerogatives on the backs of those very men. During
the Conference, no delegate phrased this as plainly as the Belgian Under-Secretary.
Instead, other delegates couched the point in terms of such nationalist sentiments
as heroism and patriotism.
The Dutch delegate clearly phrased the problem felt by the secondary powers
by pointing out that in outlawing irregulars they were essentially being required
to raise and equip a standing army along the lines of what Germany had done—
an impossible task for many. He remarked that, in practical terms, the effect of
outlawing irregular troops would mean that the secondary powers would either
have to compromise their national defense or institute compulsory conscription
as Germany had done—a course many were not prepared to accept.169 The new
rules of belligerent qualification proposed at Brussels favored the disciplined and
well-equipped regular forces of the great powers. The secondary powers were
forced either to develop inferior armies along the same lines or see their citizenry
subjected to a harsh war of reprisals.
The chief German Delegate, General de Voights-Rhetz, recognized that the
inhabitants of an invaded territory had the right of self-defence, but argued that
this defence must be organized, and this organization must be established in
peacetime. He proposed, for example, that the territory be divided into quarters
in which the levee would be called up, and local notables could be appointed
to exercise command. It was a small matter, he believed, to ask members of the
levee to affix a distinctive symbol to their apparel, to distinguish themselves from
marauders and bandits and thus protect the local population.170 What he was
proposing was essentially an organized reserve militia similar to the Landsturm
as it was then organized in Germany. Germany was all but mandating that
every nation be required to organize a similar standing reserve force. Colonel
Hammar of Switzerland agreed with Germany on this point; rising up in the
national defence was an act of patriotism, and while this was highly desirable,
the defence must be organized.171 Baron Jhomini of Russia interjected, stating
that if the inhabitants of an invaded country were to be considered as qualified
belligerents, then what would prevent such a war from becoming simply a war of

169. “Séance du 14 Août, 1874,” supra note 166 at 85.
170. Ibid.
171. Ibid at 83.
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extermination?172 The Spanish delegate opined that a lawful belligerent was simply
any inhabitant who, as a result of patriotism, took up arms against the enemy.
The German delegate replied that this assertion did not meet the chief difficulty,
which was to distinguish a patriotic belligerent from a common brigand, and
that the four organizational criteria had to be applied in order to do this.173 The
Russian delegate, General de Leer, replied that this was so, and that the four
conditions were there to better organize the defence; this would prevent a lengthy
insurrection and therefore a lengthy war of reprisals.174 Delegates queried what
resolution would best meet humanitarian goals, support the state’s consolidation
over the use of military force, and prevent the escalation of conflicts into total war.
Baron Lambermont, the Belgian delegate, noted that there were difficulties
with the ideal of a universal and obligatory military service, such as that being
proposed by Germany, Russia, and Switzerland.175 He noted that this goal would
take considerable time and expense; even so, the secondary powers would always
have numerically inferior armed forces compared to the Great Powers.176 This
inferiority needed to be balanced out by the patriotism and heroism of the
nation.177 What else could such nations fall back on in times of invasion? Several
delegates were in agreement with Lambermont on this point, including those of
the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, and Turkey.178 After reading the
minutes, the Earl of Derby, then British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
rejected these articles very succinctly, stating they “would have been greatly to
the advantage of the Powers having large armies constantly prepared for war, and
systems of universal compulsory military service.”179 The effect of Article 10 was
that unorganized warfare would be permitted, but only if the inhabitants rose
spontaneously to repel an enemy force at the time of invasion and otherwise
respected the laws and customs of war. An insurgency against an established
occupation would not be permitted. This rule had the effect of establishing both
the rights of the levées en masse to be treated according to the law, as well as the
right of conquest of an occupying power.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
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Discussed also at the Conference were a number of innovations in the laws
of war to protect civilians and promote more humanitarian conduct. In his Draft
Declaration, Martens had set out five general principles of international law that
he felt were uncontroversial, and that were among the most important of the
general principles that belonged in an international code of land warfare.180 These
articles were excised from the final Brussels Declaration. They were not rejected so
much as set aside as being too theoretical, although they laid the groundwork for
several Articles of the final Brussels Declaration181 and were indeed to be found in
treatises and later in codes of land warfare. They state:
I.

 n international war is a state of open conflict between two independent States
A
(acting alone or with allies), and between their armed and organized forces.

II.

 perations of war must be directed exclusively against the forces and the
O
means of making war of the hostile State, and not against its subjects, so long
as the latter do not themselves take any active part in the war.

III. I n order to attain the object of the war, all means and all measures in conformity
with the laws and customs of war, and justified by the necessities of war, shall
be permitted. The laws and customs of war forbid not only useless cruelty and
acts of barbarity committed against the enemy; they furthermore require from
the competent authorities the immediate punishment of those guilty of such
acts, provided they have not been provoked by absolute necessity.
IV. Th
 e necessities of war cannot justify either treachery towards the enemy, or
declaring him an outlaw, or the employment of violence or cruelty towards
him.
V.

I n the event of the enemy not observing the laws and customs of war, as laid
down in the present Convention, the opposing force may resort to reprisals,
but only as an inevitable evil, and without ever losing sight of the duties of
humanity.182

One of the most important of these principles was a recognition of the
general legal principle mandating civilian immunity from attack. This provision
is a forerunner to the general protection of civilian immunity in Article 51(3) of
Protocol I that was adopted nearly a century later,183 and is the earliest formulation
of this principle in an international legal instrument.
Delegates discussed other protections for civilians as well. The Conference
received a petition from the inhabitants of the town of Antwerp, asking that
180.
181.
182.
183.

Martens, supra note 102 at 112.
“Report of the Conference,” supra note 151 at 161.
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bombardments be confined to military forces only, not the quarters of a town
where peaceful inhabitants are residing.184 This proposition received general
favour, and it is notable how far it departs from the principle earlier declared
in the Lieber Code that “[t]he citizen or native of a hostile country is thus an
enemy, as one of the constituents of the hostile state or nation, and as such is
subjected to the hardships of the war,”185 and more specifically that military
commanders need not inform the enemy of their intention to bombard a place so
that non-combatants might be evacuated.186 The Lieber Code also provided that
“[i]t is lawful to starve the hostile belligerent, armed or unarmed, so that it leads
to the speedier subjection of the enemy.”187 The legitimacy of civilian reprisals
was giving way to the “tournament” ideal of warfare.
The Draft Declaration also contained three short articles limiting, although
not abolishing, reprisals. They stated that reprisals are admissible in extreme cases
only, when violations of the laws and customs of war have unquestionably been
violated by the enemy, that reprisals must not be disproportionate, and that they
are allowed only on the authority of the commander in chief.188 However, the
parties agreed not to discuss this section, as ill feelings were still running high over
the late war and its violent reprisals. Horsford stated, “It seemed to be the general
feeling that occasions on which reprisals of a severe character had been executed
were of far too recent a date to allow the practice to be discussed calmly.”189 It was
not thought propitious to undo all of the good work that had been accomplished
up to that late date by opening up such a difficult subject.190 Some parties wanted
reprisals abolished entirely, and faulted the Draft Declaration for failing to do so.
Baron Jhomini clarified that the intention of the Russian Project was to limit
reprisals, not to legitimate them.191 The rules concerning reprisals were uncertain
and often left up to the exigencies of military necessity.192 He had hoped that
the ability of members of the Conference to address so serious and repugnant a

184. Inclosure No 3 in letter No 12 from Sir A Horsford to the Earl of Derby (2 August 1874) in
Horsford Correspondence, supra note 20 at 16.
185. Lieber Code, supra note 47 art 21.
186. Ibid art 19.
187. Ibid art 17.
188. “Report of the Conference,” supra note 151 at 179-80.
189. Ibid at 180.
190. Ibid.
191. Inclosure in letter No 41 from Sir A Horsford to the Earl of Derby (24 August 1874),
“Protocols of the Meeting of the Commission of Delegates of the Conference, No. 16 Meeting of 20 August, 1874” in Horsford Correspondence, supra note 20 at 112.
192. Ibid.
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fact of war would have a positive moral bearing on limiting the use of reprisals
in the future.193
Despite the above achievements in setting out a draft code of the laws of
land warfare, the Brussels Declaration was signed but not ratified by the parties
present.194 There were a number of reasons—mainly political—why this was
so. Great Britain was determined not to undertake any new legal obligations
as a result of the Brussels Conference, and although the Government sent a
representative, Major-General Horsford was instructed not to participate in any
of the discussions at the Conference.195 This antipathy stemmed mainly from
Britain’s reluctance to see any changes to maritime law or the laws governing naval
warfare. The importance of the national security issues at stake is demonstrated
by the Earl of Derby’s instructions to the foreign missions requiring they use
cypher in all communications concerning the Brussels Conference.196 Thomas
Wright Fenton, a prominent British shipping magnate, wrote an impassioned
letter to the Earl of Derby, stating that in his opinion the chief aim of the
Russian project was to get the 1856 Declaration of Paris accepted as law.197 That
declaration, signed at the end of the Crimean War (1853-6), set out new rules of
naval warfare, including an agreement that belligerents would not seize enemy
goods on neutral vessels or neutral goods on enemy vessels, as well as an explicit
abolition of privateering.198 The Earl of Derby informed Lord Loftus at the
Foreign Office that “Her Majesty’s Government are fully determined not to enter
into any discussion of the rules of international law by which the relations of
belligerents are guided, or to undertake any new obligations or engagements of
any kind in regard to general principles.”199 In fact, the Earl of Derby maintained
193. Ibid. See also Hostage Trial, supra note 19. This case permitted civilian reprisals of a similar
nature committed by German forces during World War II, but this view was rejected by the
UN War Crimes Commission.
194. Letter No 57 from M Solvyns to the Earl of Derby (19 September 1874) in Horsford
Correspondence, supra note 20 at 187. This lists the signatories to the Brussels Declaration, and
it includes delegates from each country in attendance, including Major-General Horsford of
Great Britain, the delegates of France, being Baron Baude and General Arnaudeau, as well as
the jurists Martens and Bluntschli.
195. Letter No 1 from the Earl of Derby to Sir A Horsford (25 July 25 1874) in Horsford
Correspondence, supra note 20 at 2.
196. Letter No 74 from Sir E Harris to the Earl of Derby (20 July 1874) in Confidential
Correspondence Part II, supra note 51 at 34.
197. Letter No 34 from Mr Fenton to the Earl of Derby (17 June 1874) in Confidential
Correspondence Part I, supra note 51 at 21.
198. Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, Paris, 16 April 1856, arts 1-3.
199. Letter No 60 from the Earl of Derby to Lord Loftus (4 July 1874) in Confidential
Correspondence Part I, supra note 51 at 33.
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that before agreeing to send any delegate to the Brussels Conference, Great
Britain must obtain assurances from the Russian Government that the project
“shall not entertain, in any shape, directly or indirectly, anything relating to
maritime operations or naval warfare.”200 He later declared as much in the House
of Lords, and many in Europe thought that this speech delivered a decisive “death
blow” to the Russian project before it had even begun.201
The British position had considerable influence on other countries. The
Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs echoed the British position closely, stating
that at the Brussels Conference, the “Spanish Government cannot accept any
decision which would tend to make obligatory the suppression of privateering,
or to prevent the capture of goods on enemy vessels.”202 The Ottoman delegate,
who attended for the first time only on the 18th of August near the end of
the Conference—and thus missed the crucial discussions of Article 10 on 14
August—stated that his role was limited to assisting the Conference and taking
part in the deliberations, but that he would not express any but a personal
opinion, and formally reserved any expression of agreement that would bind
his government.203
Great Britain was given the opportunity to lead the smaller powers in
achieving consensus and ratifying the Brussels Declaration, but refused to do so.
In a confidential communication with the Earl of Derby, Horsford stated that
Count Chotek, the delegate from Austria-Hungary, had approached him privately,
and that “[h]is object apparently was to impress upon me that the smaller States
having Constitutional Governments, were prepared to regulate their conduct
with regard to the Conference according to the line which England might take.”204
Chotek put it to Horsford that English alignment with the secondary powers
would induce France and Austria to join in; if the Russian Emperor received the
assent of these countries to its Brussels Declaration, then England’s “alliance with

200. Ibid.
201. Letter No 19 from Mr Lumley to the Earl of Derby (8 July 1874) in Confidential
Correspondence Part II, supra note 51 at 11.
202. Letter No 58 from Mr Macdonell to the Earl of Derby (18 July 1874) in Confidential
Correspondence Part II, supra note 51 at 26.
203. Inclosure in letter No 42 from Sir A Horsford to the Earl of Derby, “Protocoles des Séances
de la Commission déléguée par la Conférence (Séance du 21 Août, 1874)” (25 August 1874)
in Horsford Correspondence, supra note 20 at 114.
204. Letter No 39 from Sir A Horsford to the Earl of Derby (22 August 1874), in Horsford
Correspondence, supra note 20 at 102.
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Russia would be strengthened, and Germany would not be drawn into a closer
intimacy with Russia, which might otherwise be the case.”205
Not only was Great Britain not interested in this diplomatic manoeuver, the
Earl of Derby excoriated in its entirety the Russian project of a draft code of land
warfare. He stated that
there is no possibility of an agreement upon the really important Articles of the
Russian Project; that the interests of the invader and the invaded are irreconcilable;
and that, even if certain rules of warfare could be framed in terms which would
meet with acquiescence, they would prove to exercise little more than that fictitious
restraint deprecated by the Russian Government at the opening of the Conference.206

The Earl of Derby took the position that there was no use in taking part in
any further discussions or conferences codifying the laws of war, and he informed
the Russian Emperor that it was the duty of Great Britain “to firmly repudiate…
any project for altering the principles of international law upon which this
country has hitherto acted, and above all to refuse to be a party to any agreement,
the effect of which would be to facilitate aggressive wars, and to paralyze the
patriotic resistance of an invaded people.”207
The German government also attended the Conference with no plans to
enter into a draft code. The British representative in Berlin, Mr. Adams, learned
through confidential quarters that Prince Bismarck felt that he could not refuse
the proposals of the Emperor of Russia, but that this was immaterial since he
would simply let the project for a draft code of land warfare falter under its
own weight.208 Relations with Russia would be improved if Germany was seen to
acquiesce in the project. As a confidential German source stated to Mr. Adams,
It, however, is calculated that the members will soon find out that so vast a
programme cannot be executed by them at once; that there will be need of special
Commissioners to examine into various subjects, that, consequently, an early
adjournment will be found necessary, and thus, for the present at least, nothing will
come of the Conference.209

The Conference turned out to be more successful than the Germans had
anticipated. A second conference was to be scheduled for 1875, after each
205. Ibid.
206. Letter No 3 from the Earl of Derby to Lord Loftus (20 January 1875) in
Accounts of HC 2 at 6.
207. Ibid at 7.
208. Letter No 43 from Mr Adams to the Earl of Derby (22 June 1874) in Confidential
Correspondence Part I, supra note 51 at 24.
209. Ibid.
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government had had time to submit the Brussels Declaration to their experts for
further study. Great Britain once again refused to participate.210 For their part,
the French government stated that they were “not disposed to be parties to any
international agreement which would restrict the patriotic efforts of a nation
to defend their country against invasion.”211 With the deepening of the Balkan
Crisis in 1875, followed by the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War in 1877,
Russia was forced to lay aside any further diplomatic conferences; the Brussels
project of codifying the international laws of war faltered under the resurgence of
full-scale war in Europe.212

IV. THE BRUSSELS CONFERENCE’S LEGACY FOR
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
The Conference at Brussels was, according to Martens himself, a “complete
failure.”213 Not only was the Brussels Declaration not ratified, but the very idea
of codifying the international laws of war by the mutual agreement of states
was called into doubt. This result was due in large part not to the nature of
codification or to the content of the proposed laws themselves, but to diplomatic
discord and a general lack of political will on the part of major powers to bind
themselves to new laws. The Brussels Conference nevertheless had an enormous
impact on the idea of law in the international arena, particularly the law most
closely associated with state sovereignty and power. The debates that crystallized
at Brussels brought the great powers to the threshold of a new understanding
of the nature of law and its role in international relations. This would enable
the ideas first presented at Brussels to triumph 25 years later, when the Brussels
Declaration would form the basis of the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.214
As Vladimir Pustogarov states, “an important role of the Brussels Conference
consisted of overcoming the atmosphere which existed [against codifying the

210. Martens, supra note 102 at 116. See also letter No 31 from the Earl of Derby to Mr Lumley
(15 February 1875) in Confidential Correspondence Part IV, supra note 51 at 27.
211. Letter No 10 from Sir A Buchanan to the Earl of Derby (21 December 1874) in Confidential
Correspondence Part IV, supra note 51 at 10.
212. Martens, supra note 102 at 118.
213. Pustogarov, Our Martens, supra note 157 at 113.
214. Hague Regulations, supra note 3.
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laws of war] and laying the basis for further creative work.”215 It was also in
keeping with public opinion in Europe at the time, helping to both reflect and
reinforce more humanitarian norms in the conduct of warfare.216
The Draft Declaration and the final Brussels Declaration that followed are
the first formal articulations of the modern rules of belligerent qualification and
the principle of distinction between civilian and military targets: Belligerent
qualification belongs equally to all those who fight on behalf of a public
authority, who follow the laws of war, who are subject to the discipline of a
military chain of command, and who clearly distinguish themselves from the
civilian population by wearing distinctive emblems and by carrying arms openly.
The only exceptions to this rule are the specific circumstances that give rise to
a levée en masse, a spontaneous uprising against an invading force. All other
combatants—partisans, guerrillas, free-corps, insurgents, rebels, and militants—
are unqualified, and their taking up arms can be treated as a criminal offence.
Although the Brussels Declaration was not ratified, the definition of a combatant
laid down at Brussels was adopted essentially unchanged at the 1899 Hague
Peace Conference, and again at the second Hague Conference of 1907.217
The rules concerning belligerent qualification set out in the Hague Regulations
were adopted almost word for word from the Brussels Declaration.218 Article 1
of Annex B: Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of the
Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907 sets out the four organizational criteria for
belligerent qualification now in use, stating:
The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia and
volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions:
i.

To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;

ii.

To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance;

iii. To carry arms openly; and
iv.

To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.

215. Pustogarov, Our Martens, supra note 157 at 113; see also Green, supra note 54 at 131.
As Green states, “what appears in The Hague Regulations is the wording of Brussels, with
but minor verbal changes,” and these criteria were subsequently adopted into Article 4 of the
Third Geneva Convention of 1949, which adopts the Hague law of belligerent qualification to
determine which combatants are entitled to the privileges of prisoner of war treatment.
216. Pustogarov, Our Martens, supra note 157 at 114.
217. Hague Regulations, supra note 3.
218. “Annex B: Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land” in Hague
Regulations, supra note 3 art 1.
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In countries where militia and volunteer corps constitute the army, or form part of
it, they are included under the denomination “army.”219

The final Brussels Declaration stated in Article 9:
The laws, rights and duties of war, apply not only to armies, but also to militia and
volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions:
1.

That they be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;

2.

That they have a fixed distinctive emblem recognisable at a distance [so that
they may be distinguished from the civilian population];

3.

That they carry arms openly; and

4.

That they conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs
of war.220

The laws adopted at The Hague were therefore determined at Brussels, and
so the deliberations at the Brussels Conference form a very important part of
our understanding of the forces that shaped these laws.221 These criteria were
subsequently adopted into Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949,
which adopts the Hague law of belligerent qualification to determine which
combatants are entitled to treatment as prisoners of war.222
The Brussels Declaration had a significant impact upon customarily accepted
usages of war in the decades leading up to the peace conferences at The Hague.
Great Britain, which had initially supported the francs-tireurs—and despite its
refusal to ratify the Brussels Declaration—would largely adopt the Declaration’s
principles. Sir Henry Drummond Wolf would approve of the findings of the
Brussels Conference, telling the House of Commons that “the articles submitted
restricted the laws, rights, and duties of war to troops of any kind commanded
by officers responsible for their subordinates conforming to the laws and customs
of war, and forbade the Constitution of an Army unless it was governed by men
having knowledge of those laws and customs.”223 Sir William Harcourt would
state in the House of Commons in 1875 that francs-tireurs were not volunteers,
and that “volunteers did not go out for gain as they did.”224 Even the Earl of
219. Ibid.
220. Brussels Declaration, supra note 1 art 9. For an English language discussion of the original
Article 9, a summary of the discussions at the Conference, and the final text of Article 9 in
the Brussels Declaration, see also “Report of the Conference,” supra note 151 at 166ff.
221. Pustogarov, Our Martens, supra note 157 at 113-14.
222. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 67 art 4.
223. UK, HC, Parliamentary Debates, 3rd ser, vol 222, col 667 (22 February 1875).
224. UK, HC, Parliamentary Debates, 3rd ser, vol 223, col 859 (13 April 1875).

844

(2017) 54 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

Denbigh, who stated that the United Kingdom would not undertake any new
obligations as a result of the Brussels Conference,225 expressed his approval for
legitimating the rights of the levée en masse. The Earl of Denbigh pointed out
that this concept was clearly intended to protect state sovereignty and territorial
integrity from outside. He stated that without the law authorizing a levée en
masse, “if a foreign force landed in Kent, that county would cease to belong to the
Queen. Hitherto the safeguard of a country had been thought to be the breast and
arm of every citizen.”226 Any proposals to deny belligerent qualification to a levée
en masse would “deprive the country attacked of that advantage.”227 Even though
Parliament rejected the Brussels Declaration and the idea of a code of land warfare,
it enthusiastically endorsed its provisions. This demonstrates the importance the
concept of the levée en masse held in expounding ideas surrounding patriotism,
nationalism, and the right of national defence.
The Russian government issued the Brussels Declaration as instructions to its
armed forces in a Code of Land Warfare that would soon be put to the test in the
Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878).228 The humanitarianism of Martens’ code had
a counterpart in the growing Red Cross movement, and both would be tested in
a bitter war between the Russian and Ottoman Empires that was characterized by
ethnic and religious animosities.229 During Russia’s final march to Constantinople
in January of 1878, the ensuing panic among the local population caused a
vast flow of refugees, depopulating entire regions and leading to widespread
starvation and disease among the civilian population in what the head of the
Red Crescent Society in Turkey would term “the spectacle of a calamity perhaps
without precedent in the annals of modern warfare.”230 For the first time, the Red
Cross was called upon to provide humanitarian relief to civilians and, while this
type of activity was then outside the scope of their mandate, they felt they could
not refuse in the face of the growing human catastrophe.231 Although the law
as it then stood was not able to protect the civilian population as such from the
violence of the war, the idea of civilian immunity was “in the air,”232 as Pustogarov
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
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states, and both the protection of civilians and the organization of humanitarian
relief were growing in importance.
Lieber himself saw the benefits of drafting an international code of land
warfare, recognizing the need to settle the law and generate more humane rules.
Shortly before his death in September 1871, he wrote to communicate this wish
to Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyn. At the time, Rolin-Jaequemyn was president of
the Institut de Droit International, which he had founded along with Gustave
Moynier, then President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
in Geneva.233 This project came to fruition in 1880, when the Institut published
the Oxford Manual of the Laws of Land Warfare.234 Article 1 of the Oxford Manual
forbade the use of violence by civilians, authorizing force only as between the
armed forces of belligerent states. Articles 2 and 3 set out the four organizational
criteria for qualified armed forces. The Oxford Manual did not include Article
II of the Draft Declaration protecting the civilian population generally, stating
only in Article 7 that “It is forbidden to maltreat inoffensive populations,” and
in Article 4 that armed forces must refrain from acts of “undue severity.”235 These
provisions better reflected the division between loyal and disloyal—or offensive
and inoffensive—civilians found in the American codes of Lieber and Field,
rather than the more innovative approach to protecting civilians taken by Droop
and Martens.236 The Oxford Manual did, however, protect public and private
property in Article 32(b), as well as religious and cultural sites in Article 34.
The Oxford Manual therefore appears to have significantly watered down or even
ignored many of the provisions discussed at Brussels that were intended to better
protect the civilian population, instead harkening back to the ideas of the 1860s.
Although the Hague Regulations did not address civilian immunity directly
by adopting an article similar to Article II of the Draft Declaration, they do
contain provisions that prohibit the killing of non-combatants. Article 23(c)
adopts Article 13(c) of the Brussels Declaration almost word for word, stating that
it is especially prohibited to “kill or wound an enemy who, having laid down
arms, or having no longer means of defence, has surrendered at discretion,”237
thus affirming the long-standing unwritten prohibition against killing those
who are hors de combat. Article 50 prohibits the collective punishment of enemy
233. Boissier, supra note 46 at 285.
234. Institut de Droit International, Oxford Manual of the Laws of Land Warfare (Oxford: Institut
de Droit International, 1880) [Oxford Manual].
235. Ibid.
236. See e.g. Lieber Code, supra note 47 art 155; Field’s Code, supra note 98 at para LXIV.6; Droop,
“Irregular Combatants,” supra note 141; Martens, supra note 102.
237. Hague Regulations, supra note 3, art 23(c).
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populations. Article 46 most directly protects the lives of civilians, for it states
that “the lives of persons” must be respected by occupying powers, as must other
basic rights, including family honor, and religious convictions and practices.
Although the principle of civilian immunity was not directly expressed in the
Hague Conventions, it received some recognition as a generally accepted principle,
albeit one whose scope was uncertain and whose enforcement was weak.
The rules of belligerent qualification as they appeared in the Brussels
Declaration and the Hague Regulations were largely based upon European concerns
arising out of the Franco-Prussian War. American jurists took little part in these
debates, preferring instead their own Lieber Code.238 The American government
had been asked by the Russian government if they would take part in the Brussels
Conference, but declined to do so.239 At the 1907 Hague Peace Conference,
US delegates again took no position concerning the debate over the proposed
definition of a levée en masse or the text of Article 1 of Annex B of the Hague
Regulations setting out the organizational criteria for belligerent qualification.240
Major General George Davis, an American military scholar and the Judge
Advocate General at the time the United States ratified the Hague Regulations,
preferred the Lieber Code over the Brussels Declaration, which he found to err too
far on the side of protecting humanitarian interests at the expense of military
necessity. He stated that the Brussels Declaration has the “disadvantage of being
adopted in times of peace, when the minds of men in dealing with military affairs
turn rather to the ideal than the practical.”241 Davis saw the Brussels Declaration
and the Hague Regulations that followed upon it as espousing quite different rules
and principles than those found in the Lieber Code, and he was in no way eager
to claim them for America’s own.
The Brussels Declaration did not end the controversy over the treatment of
irregular combatants. At the 1899 Hague Peace Conference, there was again
significant disagreement between the great military powers and the weaker states
over the issue of arming irregular fighters and their status as belligerents. This was
resolved by the introduction of the Martens Clause as the preamble to the 1899
Hague Convention II, also drafted by Martens. As Ticehurst explains,
238. Field’s Code, supra note 98; Davis, supra note 107 at 25.
239. Letter No 16 from Sir E. Thornton to the Earl of Derby (8 July 1874) in Confidential
Conference Part II, supra note 51 at 10.
240. Joseph H Choate & Chandler Hale, “Report to the Secretary of State of the Delegates of
the United States to the Second Hague Conference” in James Brown Scott, ed, Instructions
to the American Delegates to the Hague Peace Conferences and their Official Reports (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1916) 86 at 102.
241. Davis, supra note 107 at 25.
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Martens introduced the declaration after delegates at the Peace Conference failed to
agree on the issue of the status of civilians who took up arms against an occupying
force. Large military powers argued that they should be treated as francs-tireurs and
subject to execution, while smaller states contended that they should be treated as
lawful combatants.242

This divide would again be in evidence at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference
in Geneva. Captain Mouton, the delegate of the Netherlands, remarked that,
as in 1899 and 1907, there were differing views on this point between “that
of the Powers who had already repeatedly suffered invasion and were likely to
be invaded again, and that of the Powers who were more or less likely to be
Occupying Powers.”243
The positions of various delegates at The Hague in 1899 were so opposed
on the issue of irregular combatants that the entire conference was threatened.244
The Martens Clause reads:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting
Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted
by them, populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of
the principles of international law, as they result from the usages established between
civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, and the requirements of the public
conscience.245

Again, the Martens Clause failed to resolve questions concerning state
support for irregular militia, and whether they would be entitled to prisoner of
war treatment—issues that would only gain momentum as a consequence of the
widespread use of partisan forces during World War II.

V. CONCLUSION
Prior to Brussels, the right of insurrection had long been recognized. As Vattel
stated in his 1758 Law of Nations, “although the operations of war are by custom
generally confined to the troops” the inhabitants of a place taken by storm may
take up arms to recover the liberty of the territory on behalf of the sovereign,
“And where is the man that shall dare to censure it?”246 By the time of the Brussels
242. Ticehurst, supra note 68 at 125.
243. Special Committee II, “Prisoners of War, Sixth Meeting (18 May 1949, 10 a.m.)” in Final
Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, vol IIA, ICRC (Bern, Switzerland:
Federal Political Department, 1949) 428 at 429.
244. JAG Treatise, supra note 17 at 50.
245. “Preamble,” in Hague Convention II of 1899, supra note 3.
246. Vattel, supra note 44 at para III.XV.228.
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Conference there were many willing to censure it, and this heralded a shift in
thinking about war and state power more generally. The British jurist Droop
censured it because he wished to affirm the principle of distinction between
civilian and military targets and to protect civilians from the operations of
warfare.247 Martens censured it because he believed that civilians—even enemy
civilians—held imprescriptible rights to their lives, honour, and liberty, which
warring nations were bound to safeguard.248 Baron Jhomini, speaking on behalf
of the Russian Empire, censured it because he wanted to see war become a
tournament between great armies with civilians simply as onlookers, protected
from the fray.249 Germany, with its experience as an occupying power, censured it
because it wanted irregular troops outlawed and argued that an insurgency would
tend to increase military escalation and lead to severe reprisals against the civilian
population.250 The rhetoric of civilian protection put forth by humanitarian
reformers converged with the reality of military power exercised by the imperial
powers; both were important determinants of the new rules proposed at Brussels.
Baron Lambermont, the Belgian delegate, clearly phrased the problem when
he pointed out that outlawing irregulars essentially meant that the secondary
powers were required to raise and equip a standing army along the lines of what
Germany had done—an impossible task for many nations. He remarked that,
in practical terms, the effect of outlawing irregular troops would be to force the
secondary powers either to compromise their national defense or to institute
compulsory conscription as Germany had done—a course many were not
prepared to accept.251 The rules of belligerent qualification proposed at Brussels
favored the disciplined and well-equipped regular forces of the great military
powers. The secondary powers felt they would be forced either to develop inferior
armies along the same lines, or face severe reprisals. The compromise reached
was that armies should follow the four organizational criteria of belligerent
qualification; levées en masse would be permitted to repel an invading force, but
only before a full-fledged military occupation was established and only as long as
they obeyed the laws and customs of war.252 As Major-General Horsford phrased
247.
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it, the object was to “allow the invaded country every possible means of defence
short of unorganized peasant warfare.”253
Through their debates, the delegates at the Brussels Conference crystallized
the modern conception of an “old war” as a grand tournament between
professional standing armies—not as a fact of warfare or a privileged form
of battle strategy, but as an ideal of state power. In doing so, they privileged
the large, professional standing armies of the kind that had taken the field
during the Franco-Prussian War. This outcome promoted the consolidation of
national governments’ control over the military—its conscription, training, and
equipping, but more importantly its organization and funding. Actors outside
this state-centred system, including guerrilla fighters, insurgents, and civilians,
were illegitimate and therefore unqualified belligerents. Some compromises were
required to make these rules work. The exclusion of civilians and private fighters
went along with rules protecting them; this was to encourage non-state actors to
avoid taking up arms, while strengthening the national army and promoting more
humanitarian outcomes. Civilians would be permitted to take up arms against a
foreign invader, but they would have to lay them down again once an occupation
was established. This rule was adopted for the benefit of the smaller powers, who
had few standing armies and limited means of national defence. Together, the
new rules were established with the goals of enabling national governments to
strengthen their control over military force while restoring a sense of the balance
of power in Europe that had been disturbed by the rise of the great powers and
the atrocities of the late war.
This history of the Brussels Conference supports the thesis of new and
old wars. As in Kaldor’s thesis, the old war was primarily concerned with
consolidating and centralizing state power over the military. The laws and customs
concerning belligerent qualification formulated at Brussels were a watershed in
this process. The fact that the delegates could not abolish the concept of the levée
en masse—despite strong support from Germany and Russia, and at the urging of
humanitarian reformers such as Droop and Martens—also assisted in this process.
Keeping the levée en masse, even if it permitted citizens to rise in arms only at the
time of an invasion by a foreign power, facilitated the defence of smaller countries
and fostered prevailing ideals about nationalism, patriotism, and the importance
of the right of national self-defence. In most other respects, the interests of states
and the interests of humanitarian reformers dovetailed at Brussels, and it was this
convergence of interests—between humanitarian ideals and national interests,
253. Letter No 27 from Sir A Horsford to the Earl of Derby (10 August 1874) in Horsford
Correspondence, supra note 20 at 44.
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between the weaker states and the great powers—that enabled consensus and
compromise to take place. This enabled the rise of the ideal of the old war, that
war was a tournament among armies, in which civilians would be protected but
could not take part. These ideas came to lay the foundations of the international
humanitarian law as it emerged in the first half of the twentieth century.

